Testing the Responsiveness of Merit-Appointed and Elected Judges by O\u27Callaghan, Jerome
Pace Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 2 Winter 1991 Article 3
January 1991
Testing the Responsiveness of Merit-Appointed
and Elected Judges
Jerome O'Callaghan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerome O'Callaghan, Testing the Responsiveness of Merit-Appointed and Elected Judges, 11 Pace L. Rev.
281 (1991)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/3
Testing the Responsiveness of Merit-
Appointed and Elected Judges
Jerome O'Callaghant
I. Introduction
A judicial Merit Plan involves the appointment of state
judges by the governor from a list of potential candidates sup-
plied by a nominating committee.1 The Merit Plan's origin lies
in the desire to remove political considerations from the judicial
selection process.' Its design follows a familiar blueprint in
American government in that power is divided among key politi-
cal decision makers, each of whom occupies a unique place in a
complex selection machine.8
Since its adoption by several states, beginning with Missouri
in 1940, the Merit Plan has continued to be the subject of in-
tense debate.4 The major argument on behalf of the Merit Plan
is that merit-appointed judges are less apt to be influenced by
public opinion than elected judges. Conversely, the advantage of
t This work is abstracted from the author's Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1988.
The research was supported by a National Science Foundation (Law and Social Sciences
Division) grant and by an award from the Snow Foundation of Syracuse University.
1. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, ch. 1, § 1, Art. IX. This provision provides for judi-
cial appointments by the governor. The merit-appointed judges serve for a fixed proba-
tional term set by statute. At the end of the term, the eligible voters decide whether the
judge should remain in office for an additional prescribed term, at the end of which term
another vote is taken. If the judge is not retained, the office becomes vacant and another
judge is appointed by the same mechanism. For a history of the development of the
Merit Plan, see Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure - Its His-
torical Development, 7 DuQ. L. REV. 63 (1968). See also Exec. Order No. 228 of the
Commonwealth of Massachusettes, March 11, 1983.
2. See Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of
Judges - Reconsidered, 6 LAW & Soc. REV. 580 (1972), and J. CosI, JUDICIAL POLMCS,
AN INTRODUCTION 105-06 (1984).
3. Thus, various interests are served including the public's, with its veto power in
the retention election; the political parties', who retain the power of patronage through
the Governor's office; and finally, the lawyers' and judges', whose selection committee
function sets the agenda for all the other players.
4. See, e.g., Feerick & Vance, Becoming a Judge: Report on the Failings of Judicial
Elections in New York State, 9 PACE L. REV. 199 (1989).
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elected judges is that they are more responsive to their constitu-
ency, the general public, than merit-appointed judges.
Research for this article began with the hypothesis that the
sentencing patterns of merit-appointed judges differ from
elected judges when the particular offense involved is one that
causes substantial public concern or outrage. This hypothesis is
based on the assumption that elected judges, respond more
swiftly to, and more in accordance with, public opinion. Thus, in
the case of an offense that becomes less tolerable to the public
over time, sentences imposed by elected judges should become
tougher over time. Although merit-appointed judges should also
show a response over time to public opinion, their reactions will
be more restrained. Thus, while sentences imposed by merit-ap-
pointed judges may become harsher, the pace and degree of re-
sponse to public opinion will be slower.
In an effort to test this hypothesis an offense which has be-
come less and less tolerable to the public in recent years was
used so that empirical data concerning sentencing patterns could
be collected and analyzed. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
driving while intoxicated (DWI) stands out as an offense that
has greatly alarmed the public. Over time, the public's demand
has become increasingly clear - get tough on drunk drivers.5
The development of public concern can clearly be seen both in
terms of media attention and the growth of interest groups de-
voted to eliminating drunk driving.6
II. Background
A. Previous Studies
Empirical research has disappointed the proponents of the
merit plan. Curiously, the relationship between judges and the
public is rarely addressed in literature. Instead, most likely to be
explored is the background characteristics of judges selected by
different methods. The typical research question is whether the
merit plan "prefers" one type of judge - for example, older or
better educated - over another. Recent studies using different
states, courts, and time periods, have revealed -no evidence sug-
5. See infra notes 38-68.
6. See infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
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gesting that the method of selection has a clear impact on a
* judge's background characteristics. Other studies have focused
on differences in the decision-making behavior of merit-ap-
pointed and elected judges.8
For example, Atkins and Glick analyzed decisions from the
highest courts of all fifty states.e The objective of their analysis
was to test the theory that there is no relationship between sys-
tems of state selection and the decisions made by judges. 10 Rely-
ing on 1966 caseload data, the analysis focused on the rate of
success of five types of appellants." No statistically significant
relationship was found between the selection system and the
success of the appellants before the court. 2 They found no sig-
nificant differences which could be attributed to the selection
system' s and concluded that the real impact of formal judicial
recruitment was symbolic, not empirical, in nature.'
Schneider and Maughan examined decisions of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court both before and after the adoption of a merit
plan. They, too, found no significant difference attributable to
the selection system.15 Their objective was to examine the im-
pact of California's switch from an electoral judicial selection
system to an appointive one in 1935. It was widely believed that
the new system would produce a more conservative California
Supreme Court.'6 Analyzing decisions on economic issues from
1923 to 1946, the authors found that those expectations were not
borne out.'7 The percentage of so-called liberal decisions ren-
dered by the justices did not change over the period. Thus, the
7. See, e.g., Dubois, The Influence of Selection System and Region on the Charac-
teristics of a Trial Court Bench: The Case of California, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 59 (1982); Flango
& Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 25
(1979); NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (1973).
8. See infra notes 9-22.
9. Atkins & Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974).
10. Id. at 434.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 445.
13. Id. at 440.
14. Id. at 448.
15. Schneider & Maughan, Does the Appointment of Judges Lead to a More Con-
servative Bench?, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 45, 54-55 (1979).
16. Id. at 49.
17. Id. at 54-55.
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change in the selection system had no apparent impact on judi-
cial behavior.-"
In another study, Dubois examined the actual operation of
several state judicial selection systems over a twenty-five year
period.19 His goal was to subject various criticisms aimed at judi-
cial elections to careful empirical scrutiny.2 0 The analysis was or-
ganized around two topics: (1) voter turnout and behavior in ju-
dicial elections; and (2) judicial behavior on the bench,
particularly the relationship between party-line voting and the
selection system.2' He found that Democratic judges were more
liberal in their decisions than Republican judges, no matter what
selection system brought them to the bench.2 2 Dubois also ana-
lyzed bloc-voting along party lines in eight states. Again the
merit states did not distinguish themselves.
These studies each suffer the same defect; all three ex-
amined only the decisions from the states' highest courts. Thus
an important question remains: Whether the same results would
be evident at the trial court level. The nature of trial court juris-
diction presents the bench with different opportunities and con-
straints, particularly with regard to voters' perceptions. As one
appellate judge noted:
Trial judges... are on the firing line. Their conduct in presiding
over trials, their every decision and jury instruction are visible
and audible to all. But appellate judges, excepting only the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States, are often no
more visible or comprehensible to the citizen than the vapor-in-
haling priestesses at the Oracle of Delphi.23
Only one study in recent years examined trial judges' be-
havior in relation to the public. In a survey of trial judges in
Minnesota and another unnamed northeast state, Drechsel
found strong support for his hypothesis that elected judges were
more likely to cooperate with media requests concerning the
courts. 24 He also found support for the hypothesis that elected
18. Id.
19. Dusois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 178-218 (1980).
20. Id. at xii.
21. Id. at 34-35.
22. Id. at 232-33.
23. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 4 (1980).
24. Drechsel, Judicial Selection and Trial Judge-Journalist Interaction in Two
[Vol. 11:281
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judges are more likely to pay attention to media court coverage
than are merit-appointed judges. 5 Drechsel concluded that "the
real value of judicial elections may be that they lead judges to
seek some sort of communication link with the public."26
While Drechsel's study did not examine the behavior of
merit-appointed judges, its conclusion regarding the behavior of
elected judges is particularly instructive in relation to the re-
search objectives of this article. For, if any feature should distin-
guish elected judges from merit-appointed judges, it is the rela-
tionship between a judge and the public. The elected judge
should have, under standard democratic theory at least, some
commitment to the will of his constituency. That commitment
should entail following the will of the public where circum-
stances permit. The merit-appointed judge on the other hand
faces a retention election which is a much more constrained
form of the electoral process with extremely limited potential as
a positive judicial mandate. In fact, the retention election is no-
torious for the difficulty associated with losing it. "Voters play a
very small and generally insignificant part in the Missouri
plan. . . . National surveys of [retention] elections have shown
that less than one to two per cent of merit selected judges are
voted out of office .... Turnout is low and voter acceptance of
incumbents is routine. '27
B. The Study
1. The Subject Areas
This research relies on data from the trial courts of Onon-
daga County, New York, and Hampden County, Massachusetts.
The choice of these particular jurisdictions was based on several
factors. New York State has relied on partisan election of judges
States, 10 JusT. Sys. J. 6, 10 (1985). The objective of this study was to examine the
impact of two selection systems on off-bench judicial behavior. The analysis explored
news-media use and interaction with journalists, and compared judicial selection systems
in two states, one electoral and one appointive. Id. at 9-10. The results supported the
theory that judges from these two systems would deal with the media in noticeably dif-
ferent ways. Id. at 10-12. Thus judicial selection systems appeared to have an impact on
off-bench judicial behavior.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 15.
27. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS AND JUSTICE 85 (1983).
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for more than a century.2 8 Onondaga County has a relatively
large number of judges handling DWI cases. Aside from the Syr-
acuse City Court, there are twenty-six town and village courts.29
The Syracuse City Court is staffed by six judges, while the town
and village courts employ another forty-six judges.30 Onondaga
County also has a computerized court-disposition data base,
compiled under the auspices of the statewide STOP DWI pro-
gram. Finally, Onondaga County has a high volume of DWI
cases; in 1985 alone 1900 DWI arrests were made. 1
A number of factors also favor the selection of Hampden
County, Massachusetts, for this study. In Massachusetts, the
merit plan has been in use, pursuant to Executive Order, for
over a decade. The plan went into effect in 1968.2 DWI cases in
Hampden County are filed in any of the county's five district
courts. These courts are staffed by a roster of thirteen judges.83
Thirty judges have disposed of DWI cases in the time period
under consideration.34 Approximately 2200 DWI cases were dis-
posed of each year during the 1980s. 8
Hampden County, however, lacks a centralized data archive
in the area of DWI data. As a result of this limitation, it was
necessary to visit each court, take a sample from its DWI files or
docket book, and then visit the local probation department to
locate each defendant's record.
A systematic random sample of the DWI files was used in
the district courts. The sampling ratio was 1:10. Because the
Massachusetts Probation Department has published annual
figures on the arraignment and disposition of DWI cases in each
district court, the size of the sample was known in advance. This
random sample produced a data set that included decisions of
both merit-appointed and elected judges.36
28. Dunois, supra note 7, at 3.
29. See J. O'Callaghan, DWI Sentencing and Public Opinion: A Comparison of
Commission-Plan and Elected Judges 42 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1988).
30. 1986 figures.
31. O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 43.
32. Vandenburg, Voluntary Merit Selection: Its History and Current Status, 66 Ju-
DiCATURE 265, 266 (1983).
33. O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 47.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Cases where the identity of the presiding judge was unclear, or where the presid-
[Vol. 11:281
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Hampden County and Onondaga County are similar in
many respects, and thus are comparable.3 7
2. DWI as the Subject Offense
National and local indicators support the proposition that
DWI has become a topic of increasing public concern. Three key
gauges reflect that concern: (1) media coverage; (2) interest
group development; and (3) public opinion polls.
Media attention to DWI increased dramatically in the early
1980s. A survey of the New York Times Index reveals that
drunk driving stories increased by 365% between 1978 and
1985.38 The most dramatic increase in a single year, 202%, oc-
curred between 1982 and 1983. Local newspaper coverage of
DWI also increased. A survey of the DWI stories compiled in the
reporter's library of the Syracuse Post Standard revealed a
400% increase in volume of stories between 1981 and 1985, the
largest increase occurring between 1981 and 1982.89 In Spring-
field, a random sample of DWI stories in the Daily News showed
an increase of 700% between 1978 and 1985.0 The biggest jump
occurred between 1980 and 1981. "1
The dramatic increase in DWI news stories is partially ex-
plained by the emergence of interest groups devoted to an anti-
DWI campaign. The most prominent of these groups is Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD). MADD was founded by Candy
Lightner in 1980 after her daughter was killed by a drunk driver
ing judge was not appointed by the merit plan, were not used in this analysis.
37. Both counties have populations of roughly 450,000, each with one major urban
area. Hampden has a population of 444,900 and Onondoga has a population of 463,200.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 237 &
354 (1986). The city of Springfield has a population of nearly 152,000. Id. at 658. The
population of Syracuse is 170,000. Id. at 690. In addition to being comparable in popula-
tion, both counties are roughly equal in size. Hampden is the smaller at 618 square miles;
Onondaga measures 780 square miles. Id. at 237 & 354. Hampden County's annual
household income is approximately $18,600, while for Onondaga County the figure is
approximately $20,100. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, CENSUS TRACTS:
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING PHC80-2-341 and PHC80-2-346 (1980).
38. The survey was conducted by the author in 1986. See O'Callaghan, supra note
29, at 43.
39. Id. at 118-19.
40. Id. at 119-20.
41. Id.
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who had a long list of prior DWI arrests."2 Lightner's first goal
was the reform of California's DWI laws.43 Relying on relatives
of victims to organize new chapters, MADD spread rapidly. By
1982, MADD had seventy chapters nationwide. 4 The number of
chapters had risen to 320 by late 1984, and MADD claimed
600,000 "volunteers and donors. 4 5 MADD's annual reports show
public contributions of $10 million and $7 million in 1984 and
1985 respectively. 6 In October of 1985, the number of chapters
had risen to 360.4
Given that MADD placed 46 million pieces of mail in the
U.S. postal system in 1984 alone, and that it has contacted
roughly 60'1 of all American households, " its impact on public
awareness cannot be underestimated. In the case of DWI, and
some other similar issues, a rise in public awareness translates
quickly into a rise in public concern. After all, greater awareness
of the DWI death toll is enough to raise most people's concern.
The loss of 25,000 lives each year makes drunk driving "a much
more common cause of death than intentional violence. 4' 9
Awareness of the annual economic loss to the nation caused by
drunk driving is also likely to be a key cause of concern. Recent
estimates put the figure at $24 billion. 0
MADD is not the only citizen's group organized to combat
DWI. Some groups were formed earlier, others are best de-
scribed as spin-offs. Such groups include Prevent Alcohol Re-
lated Killings in Tompkins County (PARKIT), Students Against
Drunk Driving (SADD), Concerned Citizens Against Drunk
Driving (CCADD), Remove Our Adolescent Drunk Drivers
42. Friedrich, Seven Who Succeeded, TIME, Jan. 7, 1985, at 41.
43. Id.
44. Vejnoska, Citizen Activist Groups, 7 ALCOHOL HEALTH AND RESEARCH WORLD 17
(1982).
45. Friedrich, supra note 42, at 41.
46. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, MADD Annual Report 1984-85 9 (1985) (avail-
able from Mothers Against Drunk Driving, 669 Airport Freeway, Suite 310, Hurst, Texas
76053).
47. FACTS ON FILE, INC., FACTS ON FILE YEARBOOK 1985 767 (1986).
48. Jaffee, Revamped MADD Now Targets Renewals by Phone and Mail, 15 FUND
RAISING MANAGEMENT 46 (1985).
49. Holden, Rehabilitative Sanctions for Drunk Driving: An Experimental Evalua-
tion, 20 J. oF RESEARCH IN CRIME DELINQUENCY 55 (1983).
50. GOLDEN, DRIVING THE DRUNK OFF THE ROAD 140 (1983).
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(ROADD), and Truckers Against Drunk Driving (TADD).51 The
existence of these organizations, and the phenomenal growth of
MADD itself, is a clear indication of a rise in public concern
about the issue.
Finally, there are the results of public opinion polls. Na-
tional polls reveal that, in 1977, 82% of the public agreed that
there should be stricter DWI laws; by 1982 that figure had
climbed to 89%.2 In 1982, 91% of the public agreed that drunk
driving was a major problem. 8 Most significant is the response
of the public to one of the most intrusive anti-DWI policies, the
spot-check, or random police roadblocks on the highway. A 1982
survey" found 36% in favor and 62% opposed spot-checks.88 In
1985, the same survey found 51% in favor and 44% opposed to
spot-checks."'
Increased public concern is also evident at the local level. In
a survey conducted for this research, it was clear that the vast
majority of respondents considered DWI to be either a "serious"
or a "very serious" problem.57 In Hampden County, 98.6% re-
ported holding that opinion, while in Onondaga, 95.0% were of
the same mind.58 Respondents were then asked to rank DWI
with other criminal acts - for example, speeding, mugging, and
murder - in terms of offense severity. In both counties, 30% of
the respondents believed that DWI is equivalent to murder.8
51. Foley, Case Study in DWI Countermeasures, SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY RE-
SPONSES TO DRUNK DRIVING (Foley, ed. 1986).
52. The first poll was conducted on over 1500 respondents between June 17-20,
1977. See THE GALLUP OPINION INDEx 27 (Oct. 1977). The second poll was conducted
March 12-15, 1982, by personal interview of 1580 respondents. It is available from the
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, P.O. Box 440, Storrs, Connecticut 06268.
53. Roper Poll, conducted February 12-27, 1982, by personal interview of 2000 re-
spondents. Poll is available from the Roper Center. See supra note 52.
54. Gallup Poll, conducted March 12-15, 1982, by personal interview of 1580 respon-
dents. Poll is available from the Roper Center. See also supra note 52.
55. Gallup Poll, conducted March 12-15, 1982, by personal interview of 1580 respon-
dents. Poll is available from the Roper Center.
56. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, conducted May 8-13, 1985, by telephone in-
terview of 1503 respondents. Poll is available from the Roper Center. See supra note 52.
57. The survey was conducted by telephone in the spring and summer of 1986.
Working from a list of 3000 randomly selected phone numbers, 413 surveys were com-
pleted: 200 in Hampden County and 213 in Onondaga County. See O'Callaghan, supra
note 29, at 125-26.
58. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 127.
59. Id. at 128.
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Further, when the roadblock question was asked in both coun-
ties, the results were surprisingly positive. A total of 76.5% of
the Onondaga group were "somewhat" or "very much" in favor
of roadblocks; 60 in Hampden County the figure was 87.5%.61
These figures suggest that the level of concern about DWI in
these counties is great enough to overcome the fear of police
roadblocks.
Respondents were also asked about the likelihood of arrest
and conviction for DWI. In both counties the majority of re-
spondents reported that the chances of arrest were less than
10%.62 Of Onondaga respondents, 62.8% believed that the
chances of arrest were 10% or less, while in Hampden, 51.3% of
those surveyed held that view.63 In both counties, the majority,
over 70%, believed that the likelihood of arrest had increased in
the previous two years. 4 Similarly, the majority, 75-80%, stated
that the likelihood of conviction also had increased over the pre-
vious two years.65
Regarding the public's view of the appropriate DWI policy,
the most significant question required the respondents to choose
the single most effective way of reducing DWI." Both groups
surveyed were in agreement on the priority given to various poli-
cies.6" Approximately 35% suggested tougher penalties, 25%
suggested tougher law enforcement, and 18% suggested better
public information programs.68 The clear priority given to
"tougher penalties" by the respondents suggests that trial judges
do have a mandate to apply the more severe punishments al-
lowed by law.
60. Id. at 129.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 130.
65. Id. at 131.
66. Id.
67. Id. There were no statistically significant differences between the counties.
68. Id.
[Vol. 11:281
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III. Analysis
A. DWI Sentences in the Two Counties
Ideally, a direct comparison involving two sets of data, each
identifying the same variables over the same time period, should
be used to compare sentencing trends. However, such a compari-
son is impossible for two reasons. First, the key variable is the
sentence itself. Because each state law provides for a different
range of penalties, the significance of one specific sentence de-
pends entirely on its position relative to the alternatives availa-
ble in that state.
A second obstacle to direct comparison of the data lies in
the nature of the data sources. The Onondaga County data is
formatted according to the needs of a statewide prosecutorial re-
search program. 9 The Hampden County data is essentially a du-
plicate of the court records in each individual case. Thus, it is
possible to distinguish between those defendants in Hampden
County who attended the alcohol-education program and those
who were required to attend a residential hospital program.
That kind of distinction does not appear in Onondaga's STOP
DWI data. Nevertheless, examination of the DWI caseload in
both counties can lead to some general conclusions about the re-
sponsiveness of the bench to public opinion on that topic.70
The data in Table 1 requires some explanation. In
Hampden County, there appears to have been a significantly
large dismissal rate in 1982. In fact, most of these dismissals
were the result of a procedure called "Continued Without A
Finding" (CWOF). 71 This procedure allowed a judge to prolong a
case while a defendant was supervised by the probation depart-
ment and assigned to a driver alcohol education program.7 2 As-
69. Id. at 42-43.
70. The caseload data from Onondaga County was a 10% sample of a computerized
record of all county DWI cases, maintained by the District Attorney's office. The data
from Hampden County, again a 10% sample, was collected by hand from the public
records available in court offices in the county.
71. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION, TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTES, DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR DISPOSITIONS
AND PLACEMENTS IN DRIVERS ALCOHOL EDUCATION PROGRAMS 1977-1980 2 (1981).
72. Id.
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TABLE 1
Conviction Rates: Hampden and Onondaga Counties
Hampden 1982 1983 1984 1985
Disposition: N'= 140 N-152 N=138 N=170
Guilty 30.0 71.7 81.2 94.1
Dismissed 66.4 25.0 15.9 2.9
Not Guilty 2.1 3.3 2.9 2.9
Warrant Issued7 3  1.4 0 0 0
Adjusted Guilty Rate 82.1 92.8 92.8 94.1
Adjusted Dismissal Rate 14.3 4.0 4.4 2.9
Onondaga
Disposition: N=111 N=190 N=187 N=194
Guilty Pleas 92.8 93.2 93.7 95.4
Guilty After Trial 0 1.1 .5 1.0
Total Conviction Rate 92.8 94.3 94.2 96.4
78 In cases where the defendant does not appear for a scheduled hearing, a warrant
is issued for his arrest.
[Vol. 11:281
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suming the defendant stayed out of trouble and attended the
program, he then returned to court, usually three months later.7
The case was then "dismissed. '75 In fact, the defendant had
been effectively convicted and sentenced: if the defendant was
later convicted of a second offense, the earlier CWOF "dismis-
sal" was treated as a prior conviction and the sentence was ad-
justed accordingly. In 1982, the Massachusetts legislature
changed the sentencing system, replacing the CWOF procedure
with a new sentence commonly called the "24D. ' '76 While the
24D is almost identical to the CWOF sentence, it does result in
an official "conviction" in the record. CWOF was very popular
with Massachusetts judges until 1983. According to the state's
Department of Probation, 73% of all the DWI dispositions in
1976 fell under the CWOF labels.7  The adjusted guilty rate in
Table 1 is the result of reclassifying CWOF cases as convictions.
The data from both counties indicates that an increasing
proportion of DWI defendants faced conviction as the 1980s
progressed. In both counties, the conviction rate was very high;
the only unusual figure is an 82% conviction rate in 1982 in
Hampden. The increasing conviction rate might be interpreted
as a judicial response to the public outcry over DWI. However
many other factors, including more sophisticated and consistent
police methods, may also have been responsible. At this point,
sentencing practices must be examined to see if any change of
strategy occurred in either county.79
The data on sentences handed down in this period is quite
complex, largely because of the number of variables involved:
probation, suspended sentences, license revocation, mandatory
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 58.
77. 24D adds mandatory license suspension. See, OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
PROBATION, TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AN EVALUATION OF
DRUNK DRIVING IN MASSACHUSETrS, AN EVALUATION OF DRUNK DRIVING IN MASSACHU-
SETTS UNDER CHAPTER 373, ACTS OF 1982 i (1984).
78. Id. at 8.
79. Of course, in both counties, plea bargaining was the dominant method of resolv-
ing DWI prosecutions. The District Attorney's office in Onondaga appeared to exercise a
great deal of control over the sentencing outcome. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 56.
In Hampden, the Probation Officer was very influential in the sentencing process. Never-
theless, in both counties, judges remained free to reject sentence recommendations and
to apply the sanctions they believed most appropriate.
1991]
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treatment programs, and fines. Nevertheless some patterns are
evident (see Table 3). For example, in Hampden, probation be-
came more frequent for both first-time and repeat offenders.
Probation accounted for 85% of sentences for first-time offend-
ers in 1982, and reached 95% by 1985.80 For repeat offenders,
the figures were 46% and 82%, respectively.81 In both offender
categories, the use of fines decreased; 16% of first offenders were
fined in 1982, only 7% were fined in 1985.82 For repeat offenders
the figures were 71% and 18%, respectively." The only sugges-
tion of increasing sentence severity was in the repeat offender
category. Hospitalization was an ingredient in 49% of DWI
sentences in 1985, up from 23% in 1983.84 Jail sentences were
increased to 21% in 1985, up from 17% in 1982. 85 Finally, sus-
pended sentences increased from 33% to 52% of the cases in the
same period.86 The Hampden data suggests that probation is the
increasingly dominant feature in DWI sentences. Only in the
case of repeat offenders,8 7 was there some evidence of a more
severe sentencing policy in the 1980s.
As for Onondaga the data is quite similar. Fines were less
prominent in 1985, especially in the first offender category, than
in 1982. At the same time, "conditional discharges," 8 which act,
in effect, like short probation sentences, were more popular in
1985. Prison sentences were rarely imposed, even to repeat of-
fenders, and there is no pattern to prison sentencing in this pe-
riod. The raw data from Onondaga reveals slight variation in
DWI sentences from year to year - the only substantial change
80. Details of Hampden sentences were collected by hand in 1986 in various proba-
tion offices in the county. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 84-88.
81. The frequency of probation sentences is the byproduct of the increasing empha-
sis on treatment programs as an ingredient in DWI sentences.
82. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 87.
83. Id.
84. Hospitalization (i.e., mandatory residential treatment in a hospital facility) was
introduced by legislation passed in 1982.
85. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 88.
86. Id.
87. 24% of the cases
88. Here the court discharges the defendant on condition that he attend, within a
short time, an alcohol-evaluation program. The defendant must comply with the rules
and recommendations of the program. This sentence is technically different from proba-
tion as New York allows a minimum of three years probation for DWI offenders. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (3)(d) (McKinney 1991); O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 55.
[Vol. 11:281
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/3
TESTING THE RESPONSIVENESS
is the increase in conditional discharges for first-time offenders
from 50% in 1982 to 75% in 1985.80
The difficulty encountered when comparing sentence sever-
ity is that different sentence scales apply in each state. However,
in each state's DWI laws, maximum and minimum sanctions are
readily apparent in each scale.90 Using these categories, compari-
sons of sentences from both states over a number of years will be
possible, and may provide an understanding of the changes in
sentence frequency in each state. Regarding the drunk driving
laws in both states, Table 2 presents the penalty ranges which
fall under the heading of maximum and minimum penalties.
There is one important consideration to bear in mind when
examining the definition of minimum and maximum sentences.
Given the traditional reluctance of judges to apply the maxi-
mum prescribed penalties, the definitions have been skewed in
order to increase the likelihood of discovering maximum
sentences. Thus, the research definition of maximum penalty
has a broad range, while the research definition of minimum
penalty has a close fit to the law's minimum provisions.
The results of sorting the data according to this classifica-
tion are presented in Table 3. Two of the three listed penalties
(Table 2) are necessary for a sentence to qualify as either maxi-
mum or minimum.9 1 Clearly the preference of judges in both
counties is to stick close to the minimum statutory penalties for
most offenders. The maximum sentence rate speaks for itself.
Even using a very liberal definition of a maximum sentence, the
sentencing pattern remains dominated by minimum penalties.
Further, the anticipated sentencing trend toward more severe
sentences has not materialized. Indeed, the Onondaga data sug-
gests that severe sentences became less frequent in this period.92
Finally, regression analysis was applied to both sets of
89. See O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 107.
90. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (1)(a)(1) (1989); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. §
1193 (McKinney 1991).
91. The data produced three variations of the minimum sentence rate. The rate
used in Table 3 is the lowest of the three results; thus, it is the most narrow interpreta-
tion of the minimum sentence rate.
92. See Table 3.
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TABLE 2
Minimum and Maximun DWI Penalties
State and Offense Minimum Penalty Maximum Penalty
New York:
First Offense
Fine $250 or less $350 or more
Jail None 7 - 14 days
License Revocation 90 days or less 180 days or more
Massachusetts:
First Offense
Fine $300 or less $500 - $1,000
Jail None 7 days - 2 years
License Revocation 30 days or less 180 days or more
New York:
Second Offense
Fine $350 or less $450 or more
Jail None 60 days - 4 years
License Revocation 180 days or less 1 year or more
Massachusetts:
Second Offense
Fine $300 or less $750 - $1,000
Jail Under 7 days/R.T.9 60 days - 2 years
License Revocation 180 days or less 1 year or more
93 R.T. refers to a residential treatment program of two weeks or less.
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TABLE 3
Minimum and Maximum Sentences:
Hampden and Onondaga Counties
County, Offense, Sentence 1982 1983 1
Hampden County:
First Offense
Minimum sentence 99.0 96.4
Maximum sentence 0 0
Maximum II sentence 94  0 5.5
Second Offense
Minimum sentence 78.6 61.5
Maximum sentence 0 0
Maximum II sentence 7.1 15.4
Onondaga County:
First Offense
Minimum sentence 88.6 82.4
Maximum sentence 11.4 17.6
Second Offense
Minimum sentence 90.0 84.6 1
Maximum sentence 10.0 11.5
1984 1985
97.9
0
2.0
60.0
0
15.0
89.5
10.5
97.6
0
5.5
70.4
0
7.4
93.2
6.8
96.2
0 3.8
' The Maximum II sentence is the product of a relaxation of the original conditions
for a maximum sentence. Instead of requiring that any two of the three maximum penal-
ties apply, the Maximum II asks that any one of the three penalties apply.
1991]
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data to discover how much of the variation in sentences was re-
lated to the year of the decision. 5 In the Onondaga data the
result was an R-squared of .02." In the Hampden data the range
of R-squared scores was from .00 to .18. 9 The latter score ap-
plied to the "court costs" penalty which was introduced by legis-
lation in the middle of the research period - 1983. Thus, in
neither set of data is there any substantial evidence indicating
that as the 1980s progressed DWI defendants faced more severe
sentences.
B. Caseload Characteristics
A final consideration in the examination of sentencing
trends is the relevance of other caseload characteristics to the
sentencing data. For example, are personal injuries more com-
mon in DWI caseloads in recent years? Is any trend evident in
the blood alcohol content of DWI defendants? Because each
data set offered different variables, each county will be ex-
amined separately in this section.
With regard to the Hampden caseload, no significant
changes are evident in the data. First, injury cases are few, and
there is no time-based pattern to the injury rate.98 Likewise, the
fatality rate is low and apparently random. 9 Finally, while the
data suggest that the accident rate did increase dramatically in
1984, that increase is the product of new reporting methods used
by the police from 1984 onward.1"0 Thus, data from 1984 and
1985 are not comparable to earlier figures. The number of other
charges brought against the defendant has not changed substan-
95. Regression analysis enables a researcher to determine the extent of a relation-
ship between changes in one variable (for example, sentences) and changes in another
variable (for example, the year of the sentence). The R-squared figure is the standard
regression measure; its maximum value is 1, indicating that all variation in one variable
can be explained by variation in another variable. The minimum R-squared value is 0,
indicating no relationship between the variables. The Onondaga data suggest that only
2% of the variation in sentences is related to the year of the sentence. For more on
regression analysis, see ZEISEL, SAYING IT WITH FIGURES 166-85 (1985).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Only in 1984 did the injury rate climb above 2% of the caseload. See
O'Callaghan, supra note 29, at 82.
99. Id. The rate peaked in 1983 at 1.3% of the caseload.
100. Id.
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tially. Approximately 34% faced a DWI charge and no more,
while 50-55% were subject to one or two other charges. The vari-
ation from year to year was unpredictable. As for the age groups
of the defendants, again there was little variation in this period.
Similarly, the proportion of first time DWI offenders has varied
little: from 77.6% of the caseload in 1982 to 77.8% in 1985.101
As for Onondaga, the available data indicate no significant
caseload changes in this period. The defendants' age groups re-
mained quite stable. Likewise, the blood alcohol content re-
mained consistent; each year the vast majority (76%) of the de-
fendants fell in the .10%-.20% range. There was some variation
in the defendants' prior records - an important factor in sen-
tencing. In the 1983 cases, an unusually large proportion of de-
fendants had a prior DWI conviction.1 0 2 Interestingly, the fact
that there was an unusually large second offender caseload in
1983 may be related to the unusually high maximum sentence
rate evident that year.103
IV. Conclusion
The data from Hampden and Onondaga counties did not
support the research hypothesis. There is no sign that height-
ened public concern over DWI offenders influenced judicial deci-
sion-making resulting in increased sentence severity in the mid-
1980s.104 Thus, despite increased public concern over DWI,
neither merit-appointed nor elected judges were affected enough
to fashion a new sentencing policy. Both groups of judges are
remarkable for their relative passivity. Indeed the one sugges-
tion of an increase in sentence severity reversed the original hy-
pothesis: second offenders sentenced by merit-appointed judges
(Hampden County) received harsher treatment in the mid-
1980s.
Although both the caseload and the conviction rate in both
counties have increased, it is punishment which falls in the
unique province of judges whether they are elected or appointed.
101. Id.
102. In 1983, 14% of those arrested, compared to an average of 10% for the other
years, had a prior drunk driving conviction.
103. See Table 3.
104. Id.
1991]
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, the tendency of both types of judges has been to
rely on minimum statutory provisions.10 5 Thus, trial judges in
DWI cases appear content to have sentencing policy, and actual
sentences, determined by the legislature.106
Returning to the broader issue of the alleged advantages of
the merit plan, this research is in agreement with a large body of
literature. To the extent that selection system appears to have
no impact on trial court sentencing, merit-appointed judges are
no more unresponsive - or responsive - than their elected
counterparts.
The debate over the "best" method of selecting state judges
has often been framed in terms of two theoretical underpin-
nings: judicial independence versus judicial accountability. The
selection system most closely associated with judicial accounta-
bility is, of course, the electoral system. The Merit Plan is, on
the other hand, most closely associated with enhancing judicial
independence from politics. This research suggests that elected
trial judges and merit-appointed trial judges are not noticeably
more or less responsive than each other. Selection system litera-
ture suggests two reasons for this phenomenon. Political connec-
tions are a crucial factor in the "non-political" Merit Plan.107
Electoral systems are notorious for a lack of voter interest.10 8
Thus, it appears that the two selection systems have more in
common than their advocates usually acknowledge. It may well
be that the idea of accountability versus independence is beside
the point. Any system existing in the real world of politics and
voter apathy is bound to include traces of both qualities.
The hypothesis of this research expressed the idea that
elected judges would be more responsive to clear demands of
105. Sometimes judges will sentence below the law's minimum provisions. These
anomalous sentences were apparent in this data and are common across the nation. A
Department of Transportation study indicates that this was a nationwide phenomenon
in 1983. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINIS-
TRATION, DWI SANCTIONS: THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE 111-2 (1983).
106. It may be the case that variables not examined here play a part in examining
the surprising stability of DWI sentences. Such variables might include the race and
socio-economic status of the defendant, and the background of the sentencing judge.
107. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 352-53
(1969).
108. See H. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS AND JUSTICE 79 (1983); H. STUMPF, AMERICAN
JUDICIAL POLITICS 175 (1988).
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public opinion than merit-appointed judges. Instead, within the
boundaries of this two-county data set, it is fair to conclude that
merit and elected judges have a great deal in common - they
are equally unresponsive to the vagaries of public opinion about
DWI. It may be the case that the socialization process explains a
great deal more about judicial sentencing policy than the selec-
tion process. While elected judges can theoretically be more
aware of the opinions of the public, it remains to be seen
whether their behavior reflects that relationship in any signifi-
cant manner.
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